Background
Greenhouse gases are increasing the mean temperature of the planet. While a warmer planet does have some advantages, there are considerable economic and social costs from the warming of the planet. Much of the world relies on economic systems that are geared towards traditional climate models. This means that economic, industrial, and social structures would be disrupted at a severe cost to the various institutional structures around the globe. The world is completely interdependant and, therefore, what affects one, will affect all. Advantages of global warming, such as longer growing seasons for farmers, an increased arable land area, and, reduced heating costs, will not be able to adequately counteract the disruption to norms during the transition period. Current greenhouse gas effects, such as the warming of the ocean and the changing weather patterns, have resulted in, for example, increased incidents of extreme weather. Some examples are the following: flooding caused by increased snow melt from severe winter weather and large snow falls; flooding caused by increased rain fall; hurricanes causing near to complete destruction of livlihoods and infrastructure; and, extreme cold weather causing extensive infrastructure damage. These severe weather events also cause increased mortality rates. Global leaders and economists must, therefore, find ways to cooperate with each other in order to work together to reduce greenhouse gass emissions.
Research Question
The research question in this proposal is the following: Is it possible to coordinate the interests of countries and strengthening global cooperation, while multi-lateral efforts are undertaken to reduce greenhouse gas emissions?
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework used to address this question will rely on theories related to global collective action. Specifically, strategic action needs to be taken now, in order to avert irreversible damage to most economies. International environmental governance has two very distinct characteristics, that is, the collective nature of the environmental threat and the public goods characteristic. Environmental governance includes the behaviour and activities of both nation states and those agencies identified as non-state actors. That would be non-governmental organizations and international organizations; for example, World Wildlife Federation and the United National Environmental Program, the United Nations Development Program and the World Bank. All these actors have a part to play in global environmental governance. Together they represent collective global actors. Each stakeholder has its own agenda and when collective action is needed, each stakeholder requires that the share of responsibility and contributions be equal or at least related to the stakeholder’s economic ability to contribute without affecting, for sates, the gross national product, and for NGOs, an equitable contribution. This equitable contribution may be regarded as “free rider” behaviour when there is non-exclusive public goods consumption, leading to the Prisoner’s dilemma, which is not an optimal response. Game theory comes into play, specifically, Nash equilibrium based on the interconnectivity of the global financial and political systems. Each player understands the broader equilibrium strategy of other players and, therefore, state and NGO strategies are keyed to work within such a system. The system is comprised of strategic decisions and interactions, optimal use of technology, and multi-lateral institutional arrangements that will allow cooperation, without threatening individual sovereignty and economic outlook.
Thesis
The thesis of this proposal is the following: It is possible to coordinate both the interests of countries and strengthen global cooperation in a multi-lateral effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions around the world.
Methodology
The methodology used to address the research question and thesis noted above will be by the use of deductive analysis of case histories. The following case studies will be considered in addressing this topic, as each example highlights critical aspects of the global collective action model. BPs’ Target Neutral program (BP Global) which operates in a number of different economic environments; Walmart’s own greenhouse reduction activities reflective in its supply chain management system; and, Exxon’s business response to climate change, as the organization extracts fossil fuels from regions of the world were environmental policies are not strict, yet sells this fuel to countries with legislated environmental policies that are not flexible. All three companies conduct business on a global level and, consequentially, must address issues of greenhouse gases and climate change (Regester and Larkin 111).
Rationale
The rationale for this proposal is the following. Greenhouse gases pose a severe threat to the stability of the global climate. Understanding the collective environmental governance model and the variables in play is important in understanding how to meet the economic risks that greenhouse gas emissions will create. The risks cannot be addressed by a handful of countries and disregarded by other countries. All the countries with the highest greenhouse gas emissions must undertake joint methods of addressing the problem. The reason for this is that without critical mass, the efforts of the few will be worthless. Countries with economic might and power can assist less fiscally strong countries. This is based on the fact that weak-links can be strengthened so that overall goals are reached (Sandler 33-38).
Preliminary Bibliography
BP Global. Target Neutral. 2017. 30 September 2017 .
Davis, J. “Akerlof and Kranton on identity in economics: inverting the analysis.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 31 (2007): 349–362.
Fine, B. “The economics of identity and the identity of economics?” Cambridge Journal of Economics (2008): 1-17.
Kauffmann, C., Less, C. and D. Teichmann. “Corporate Greenhouse Gas Emission Reporting: A Stocktaking of Government Schemes.” OECD, 2012.
Ostrom, E. “How types of goods and property rights jointly affect collective action.” journal of Theoretical Politics 15.3 (2003): 239-27.
Ostrom, E. “Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change.” Global Environmental Change 20 (2010): 550–557.
Ostrom, E. “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges.” Science 284.278 (1999).
Regester, M. and J. Larkin. Risk Issues and Crisis Management in Public Relations: A Casebook of Best Practice. London: Kogan Page, 2012.
Rogelj, J., M. Meinshausen and R. Knutti. “Global warming under old and new scenarios using IPCC climate sensitivity range estimates.” Nature Climate Change 2 (2012).
Sadler, T. Global Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Sandler, T. “Strategic Aspects of Difficult Global Challenges.” Global Policy 7.1 (2016): 33-45.
Weitzman, M. “ON MODELING AND INTERPRETING THE ECONOMICS OF CATASTROPHIC CLIMATE CHANGE.” The Review of Economics and Statistics XCI.1 (2009).

 
Works Cited
BP Global. Target Neutral. 2017. 30 September 2017 .
Davis, J. “Akerlof and Kranton on identity in economics: inverting the analysis.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 31 (2007): 349–362.
Fine, B. “The economics of identity and the identity of economics?” Cambridge Journal of Economics (2008): 1-17.
Kauffmann, C., Less, C. and D. Teichmann. “Corporate Greenhouse Gas Emission Reporting: A Stocktaking of Government Schemes.” OECD, 2012.
Ostrom, E. “How types of goods and property rights jointly affect collective action.” journal of Theoretical Politics 15.3 (2003): 239-27.
—. “Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change.” Global Environmental Change 20 (2010): 550–557.
—. “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges.” Science 284.278 (1999).
Regester, M. and J. Larkin. Risk Issues and Crisis Management in Public Relations: A Casebook of Best Practice. London: Kogan Page, 2012.
Rogelj, J., M. Meinshausen and R. Knutti. “Global warming under old and new scenarios using IPCC climate sensitivity range estimates.” Nature Climate Change 2 (2012).
Sadler, T. Global Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Sandler, T. “Strategic Aspects of Difficult Global Challenges.” Global Policy 7.1 (2016): 33-45.
Weitzman, M. “ON MODELING AND INTERPRETING THE ECONOMICS OF CATASTROPHIC CLIMATE CHANGE.” The Review of Economics and Statistics XCI.1 (2009).