For Law firms looking to invest in innovation, what should their immediate priorities be, why, and what are the risks associated with those priorities?
- The right time for disruptive innovation
The determination of whether an innovation is disruptive or not is on the needs of the customers. If an innovation is not disruptive it is simply sustaining. In that case, if an incumbent company uses innovation to better the services to the current customer base, then that is sustaining innovation, but when a company uses innovation to target new customers, or target existing customer in ways that that are not of interests to the incumbent, then that innovation is disruptive.
- Non-consumers: provision of inferior offers to unserved customers
Disruptive innovation sometimes allows for creation/capture of new markets thus allowing those that were not previously customers to start using the company products. The existing customer base doesn’t at least at the first instance shift to the new product. Disruptive innovation targets those without an option to be customers and these are the first consumers of disruptive products. An example of this scenario is in the computer industry where, the introduction of the first mini-computers didn’t entirely cannibalise the customer base for mainframe computers, but rather, it gave an opportunity for those who didn’t affords mainframe computers to own a computer. On the same note, when the first Altair and Apple IIs where launched, they didn’t replace minicomputers, but rather entered the computer marker for the first time.
The various computer products discussed above couldn’t compete at the time they entered the market, with the dominant legacy providers. As a result, a consumer who needed an IBM 360 mainframe or a control data minicomputers could not have the Apple II met those needs as it was considered to be more rudimentary capabilities.as a result, this new technology by virtue of its inferiority was considered to be a new product for a different market with different needs. In the legal marketplace, an example of disruptive innovation would be in the offering of form documents to consumers. Fundamentally a form legal document is inferior to the services of a competent lawyer. A lawyer can use their acquired specialised expertise to analyse and evaluate the needs of a client and not only offer a properly written document but also the correct document for the particular needs of the client.
- Overshot customers: replacement of products that over more than what the customer needs
The other opening for disruptive innovations is when the innovation curve has inclined faster than that for consumer needs. This means that the products in the market are not just good enough, but are more than good enough and thus, they offer more than what the customer needs. In such a case, disruptive innovations that offer a cheaper and simpler solution might be just enough to meet the needs of the customers. An example of a disruptive innovation that was marketed to overshot customers is the original discount long distance telephone services among them MCI. The original MCI was not as convenient as other services at the market at the time, for example the existing AT&T long distance service, its quality of connection was not as good as, but it was able to sufficiently meet the needs of many corporate consumers and at a cheaper rate.
In product cycle, the lower cost option is used to take advantage of consumer’s changing preference as the product matures. In the early stages of the product, customers will often focus on the criterion that defines the core quality of the products for example, reliability and base functionality. As technology improves, and the products matures thus advancing in the product cycle, base functionality and reliability become more of a given feature and thus customer preferences pertaining the products, at least for some customers, shift to features such as ease of use, the ability to customize the product and price.
In the law market place, firm’s reflection on a response to an overshot market is through the rise of Legal Process Outsourcer (LPO). In the past, the production of massive documents and review of the same typically involved “bet the company” transactions or cases that required elite law firms. However, and as corporate clients became accustomed to the production of massive documents and its connection to frequent litigations or corporate transactions, the sense that only elite law firms were competent enough to handle such matters manned. This shift provided an opportunity for LPO firms to introduce and bring t the market a good enough lower cost offering that even the non-elite law firms could match effectively.
- Undershot customers: products that are not good enough
Just as technology moves up, it allows firms to move upmarket and their products also improve. This ability plays a vital function in determining how disruptive technology roils the market where the incumbent are offering products that are not affordable or products that overshot the market. The starting point of entry into the market is with a product that doesn’t meet the needs of the best consumers of the existing dominant players. If in the marketplace mastering experiences or new technology allow for only constant improvement of the incumbent products, then the starting disruptive product is only the beginning of the disruption process. Once a firm offering disruptive products grounds itself in the market, then it may find that its customers want a better quality product or a product with more features. In such a case, these are underserved customers and they present an opportunity for a firm to not only enter the market with disruptive innovations, but also allows such a firm to market sustaining upmarket products.
In the law market, automated document assembly can be used as an example of how technology moves upmarket. As stated earlier, legal form documents are inferior services compared to the services of competent lawyers. Nevertheless, if as a result of better and more interactive technology consumers are able to get a correct and correctly and fully filled form, then those that prefer this form of service would move upstream to the interactive version. In such a case, the improved forms would have a negative impact on layers businesses as it would siphon a faction of not all customers from the lawyer businesses.
- Interaction of legal services regulation with disruptive innovation theory
Innovation in the legal market is affected by both the regulations of lawyers and the forces that are described by the innovation theory. Regulations of the lawyers define a business model and not a product. Even though the legal marketplace is divided into individual and corporate submarkets, that have very diverse clients with particular needs, the value configuration is applicable to all lawyers. Innovation theory dictates that law firms, including the large firms that dominate the corporate market and the small firms and solo practitioners that dominate the individual and small company side of the market, have the capability to become sustaining innovators, but they cannot embrace disruptive innovations that do not match their resources, values, and process.
The effect of regulation therefore must be considered in relation to the core insight of disruptive innovation theory that, the dominant legacy providers of products and services are not unwilling to pursue disruptive innovation; rather, they are simply unable to. The resources, values, and process of the organizations they operate in simply prevent them from adopting disruptive models. In addition, the legacy providers are particularly unable to shift down the market to lesser lucrative or small niches. Based on the fact that lawyers provide legal services, then it follows by default that the innovations that that are done will be sustaining and not disruptive innovations, hence such innovations can only benefit customers of legal services. For example, legacy providers are able to sustain innovation and thus increase the quality and lower the prices for legal services, until the time when they are driven out of the market by disruptive entrants, based on the fact that, incumbent can not disrupt.
Similarly, lawyers can lower the cost of their services or improve their services by averaging sustaining innovations. However, the services provided must by definition, involve sufficient customization, components of the solution shop so as to comply with the regulatory environment and thus, by virtue remain a personalised service that is inherently resistant to transparent price competitions. The business model that is decreed by the regulatory structure applies to all lawyers, but it doesn’t apply to all vendors of law related services therefore, non-lawyer players in the legal industry have become important competitors in the market. In the corporate front of the legal market, the unauthorised practise of law has been enforced less aggressively and thus, it appears to be a less barrier to innovation than the market structure forces that bewilder the incumbent law firms. The increase of offices for general counsel has allowed innovation in the corporate market for legal services. If a legal assignment needs to be done by a corporate legal department, it can be better done by access to the automated database, through buying standardized products or even by use of good enough non-lawyers. Corporate counsel can and have used these option to successfully take jobs and this therefore, presents an opportunity for disruptive innovators to find an entry in to such legal market.
At the personal side of the market, market structure and regulation are barriers to disruptive innovation. Even though lawyers can use sustaining innovation for the purpose of reducing products costs and improvement of products quality, they are required to provide solution shop answers as a mandatory. The increased class actions against purported unauthorised practise of law violators has resulted to the business risk related to unauthorised practice of law increase more than ever before. It is evident that unauthorised practise and enforcement of law has the capacity to prevent innovation. In some selected cases, the effect is direct, with the problems having the power to bring about accelerated bankruptcy of legal organizations. In other cases, the effect is indirect.
The ability to enforce develops uncertainty that prevents investment in legal services delivery methods that could be prohibited as being unauthorised methods of practising law. The ability to enforce can also be the cause for vender offering products that fall below their technological potential aiming at avoiding charges or providing personalized services; law firms that are outside the scope of unauthorised practise of law may not take the next logical step of making their products more desirable to customers. In the individual side of the market where the unauthorised practise of law retains significant bite, the impact is more significant. In the United States, there is evidence to show that there are masses of the population that remain unserved as well as underserved by legal services provision. The inadequate access or the lack of access to legal services negatively impacts not only the consumers, but also the entire court and justice system. Disruptive innovation theory indicates that the traditional solution shop providers cannot move down the market as to serve these costumers. The new disruptive vendors who might have the opportunity to deliver inferior legal services compared to those delivered by lawyers, but better than the current nothing, will have to overcome the barriers of unauthorised practice of law so as to partake in the markets and deliver legal services to the underserved and the unserved customer.
- Steps in taking over markets
Disruption occurs gradually and not at once, through the value chain evolution theory, which relies on a core observation that in the modern world, technology tends to improve quickly than how customers become more demanding. This law allows that, products that were once low-end products to deliver more usability relatively quickly. This means that, products that were not good enough at first become so after interactive improvements while those that were formerly good enough become better than good enough delivering excess capabilities and allowing for charging of an excessive cost. Through this process, products that were not good enough can come to drive the incumbent from the market. An example is the steel industry where, steel could be made from scrap metal, and even though the quality of steel was so low and unattractive for major mills, overtime, the quality improved and the product moved upstream to the top slab metal. The process of taking over the market and driving the incumbent out is reinforced by the fact that the incumbent can’t move down the value chain to compete with the newly developed markets.
Three value configurations models have been developed to explain the steps of taking over markets; value chain businesses, solution shop businesses, and value network businesses. However, there are risks attached to these models. For the value chain businesses, it is argued that this model doesn’t fit all business because while some businesses are involved in transformation of products, others are not. The solution shop business risk is that, the true nature, the best solution, and the scope of the problems are unclear and thus, off-shelf-shelf solutions have to be applied followed with frequent evaluations to determine is the solution is working as the case for medical doctors, and even lawyers. Lastly, the value network businesses model is limited in that, its success is dependent on the network in which the connections are made. For positive results, the network has to be sufficiently large as in the case of clubs, insurance companies, and banks.
- Issues affecting the reception of law and economics
Reception of scholarly and legal innovations varies across regions. In this section, the case in point is the US and the European region and how reception of scholarly innovation is between the two regions. This is done through analysis of various issues that are considered to have a significant impact on reception of disruptive scholarly innovation. This is done in an effort to determine why there are differences in receptivity to scholarly innovations across regions.
- Political ideologies
One of the common reasons why there is variation in receptivity of scholarly innovation is because of the differences that prevail in the legal arena. Different jurisdictions have different political ideologies and the number of political ideologies is just as many as there are jurisdictions to practise them. In the US and Europe, the two economic blocks have different political ideologies. The US is highly friendly to free market, classic liberalism than Europe is and thus, the US is considered to be far much receptive to classical liberal arguments that the European legal academy. Based on the consideration that law a and economics is perceived to be a legal version of the free-market or Chicago school economics, then it’s warm welcome in America and the otherwise cold shoulder in the European region are reflections of the variant dominant ideologies in the two regions,.
Therefore, if the political ideology prevailing in the US law schools is politically conservative and there is an appearance of an academic method of examining law that seems to be conservative, then the same is absorbed in the US law schools. On the other hand, if European law schools are by principle politically leftists, then they will reject law and economics because it is considered by them to be an antithetical to their primary ideological values. However, there are three principal challenges to this explanation. First, the American law schools tend to be left-of-center and not politically conservative. One could therefore argue that there are some of the American law schools that are conservative, allegedly, at the University of Chicago and the University of Virginia, and other that are liberal and those that only the conservative law school faculties have absorbed law and economics. This argument is however not true and doesn’t hold.
The characterization of the university of Chicago law school faculty as particularly conservative has been outlived, if it was at any one time true. Nevertheless, there are some law schools that are well known to be leftists for example, Yale Law School, and have magnificent strengths in law and economics. That notwithstanding, the American receptivity of law and economics is far too enormous to be described through the analysis of center of political gravity on specific institutions. Second, it is suspect that the political inclinations of law school faculties in Europe and the US are reasonably close, particularly; they are generally left-of-center. Based on the variations in the adoption of law and economics but the similarities in terms of the political ideologies prevailing in faculties, there has to be another reason that explains these variations.
Third, in case scholarly disruptive innovations were to be explained through the prevailing political ideologies of law school faculties, then it would be expected that innovations would be skewed towards the left-to-center innovations and expectedly, these innovations would be similar to one anther regardless of the region, as long as the political ideologies prevailing in the regions are the same, but the adoption rate of innovations in very different. Left-of-center innovations for example, critical legal studies have never been adopted in Europe as well as in the US. Almost every type of innovation has caused a fling in the US, including positive political theory, law and literature, law and society, but very few have caused the same sensation in terms of political ideology for European law schools.
Potential path dependence is another phenomenon that is worthy discussing. Based on the theoretical argument that right-leaning law school faculties absorb rightist innovations and left-leaning faculties absorb leftist innovations, then it would mean that once a faculty leans towards a given way, which would set in motion a process that reinforces the starting and continuation of a political ideology of the faculty. If to this setup we added was added a plausible corollary that the leftists would hire other leftists and the rightists would hire other rightists, then the resulting scenario is one where it would seem almost inevitable gradual drift to an extreme. Practically, this rarely happens. It is therefore concluded that, the characterization of law and economics as either leftists or rightist innovations is incorrect and that the prevailing political ideology for law schools faculties don’t provide an explanation for the rate of adoption of legal innovations.
- The success of law and economics and money
Money and the success of law and economics is a variation of the argument that suggests political ideology to be a significant factor in accounting for legal innovations generally and success of law and economics in particular. One of the suggestions with respect to the issues of money and the success of law and economics is that, there are parties eternal to the academy that are willing to subsidize scholarly and other works specifically innovations. This explanation has been frequently used to explain the distribution of law and economics in North America. This argument through implications makes two critical and wide reaching claims; one, that the availability of external resources available to the proponents of innovations is a significant factor in explain the acceptability of legal innovations, and two, that legal innovations that have this external help would have much easier time in succeeding than it would be otherwise dictated by the merits of the innovations.
What this argument seems to suggest is that, in North America where the rate of innovation is high, money is used to boost the success of such innovations, regardless of the merit of such innovations. It is misleading to think that in the history of the last several years littered with scholarly legal innovations and the adoption of the same, that money has been the factors towards the same. It is agreeable that, at least to the best of the popular understanding, money has never been able to purchase an entire discipline’s point of view as to allow for success of innovations even when they don’t ascribe to the general discipline. However, this is not to say that money doesn’t help is innovations getting a hearing from legal scholars.
After all, there are many potential innovations at least in North America, innovations that are constant completion for the time and attention of legal scholars. To catch attention of these legal scholars, such devices like eye-catching publications, conferences in attractive and high places locations, grants for writing released from teaching obligations, and subsidized publications by authority journals or university presses are some of the avenues through which money can play a role. The point here is that, eventually, the true test of legal scholarly innovation is its capability to be accepted based on its scholarly merit. This is where any scholarly work gets to be filtered on the basis of its helpfulness to the field based on the contents of the work. This is the basis that is believed to be the common operational platform for all disciplines in the modern research fields for all universities.
This argument is overshadowed by the fact that, universities, being viewed as sources of academic excellence, are sensitive to charges that their neutrality has been compromised by external funding. To curb against this, various universities have put in place fairly stringent mechanism that have proven to be effective towards guarding against suspicions that their research results are bought in exchange for funding from external parties. This argument is based on the authority belief that, very reputable institution of higher learning anywhere in the globe, regardless of how much they are hard pressed for funds; they would strongly resist getting involved in any escapade of this nature. This is based on the understanding that, it is not worth it to acquire funds in exchange of particular results and thus compromise the hard and long earned institution reputations in an instant.
In the long run, it will be largely agreed that, innovations must prove their worth to scholars learned in any discipline. Based on this, it is true that, any innovation that is wrong doesn’t, simply stand the test of time in the current highly vibrant and highly competitive academic field. Finally, it would be argued that the academy in almost always skeptical of innovations hence what has been referred to as a ‘paradigm’ that bears the powerful grip on any entrenched discipline in any academy. What Kuhn refers to as a ‘paradigm shift’ from the conversional paradigm happens when a compelling alternative presents itself. This argument is substantiated in the fact that, those who every academic discipline is conservative to change as those who are learned in the discipline have made significant investment in the same and in the event of new paradigm they incur significant costs. It is therefore presumed that, for them to include these costs there must be a high return for the costs invested,. On this basis, the burden for legal innovations to prove their worth is very high and money doesn’t qualify as one of the criteria that feature predominantly in the acceptance of any scholarly innovation at large.
- Civil law vs. common law
The other frequent assertion that is floated around regarding innovation is that the receptiveness of legal innovations is affected by the features of the underlying legal systems. This argument holds that, common law is amenable to if not demanding of law and economics while on the other hand, civil law and the related systems don’t need innovations. One of the features of common law is that it is necessarily ‘under-theorized’ in the sense that, the decision of a judge under common law is not instantiation of the explicit theory for dispute resolution of the type before the judge. Rather, judges under common law work incrementally by fitting patterns of new facts into an existing precedent and they do this without overly scrupling to present the theory of the area of the law in which the dispute represents.
This under theorization of common law could develop a major need for unifying theory. First, common law doesn’t strive to be comprehensive and thus, it has gaps that have to be covered through fact presentation and fitting through gap-filling decisions. Second, a common claim concerning common law is that it tends to ‘work itself pure’, meaning to get things working in the long run. Third, based on the question why laws are made in a certain direction, one can argue that systems that depend on legislatures to develop the bulk of common law are inevitably going to have laws that are less efficient because legislatures are more interested in distributive matters that efficiency.
The last two explanations have two problems as to why law and economics is more suitable for common law. One, selective litigation hypothesis should hold in any legal systems or better still, in any legal systems with a slightly stronger common law compared to civil law and two, there is no particular justification as to why legislatures may not be interested in law for economic analysis just as judges under common law. Therefore, there is not any reason that can be established for common law and civil law systems to as for one to be more congenial to legal innovation generally or to law and economics specifically.
- Backhouse, Roger. “The Rise of Free Market Economics: Economists and the Role of the State since 1970,” in Symposium: Economists and the Role of Government, in STEVEN MEDEMA & PETER BOETTKE EDS, 37 HISTORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 355 (2005).
- Benforado, Adam & Hanson, Jon. The Costs of Dispositionism: The Premature Demise of Situationist Law and Economics, at 24
- Bernstein, Anita. Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, at 303.
- CAMPBELL, RAY WORTHY. RETHINKING REGULATION AND INNOVATION IN THE U.S. LEGAL SERVICES MARKET. JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS, 9, No. 1, 2012.
- CHRISTENSEN, CLAYTON M. & RAYNOR, MICHAEL E. THE INNOVATOR’S SOLUTION: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUCCESSFUL GROWTH 34 (2003)
- CHRISTENSEN, CLAYTON M. THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: THE REVOLUTIONARY BOOK THAT WILL CHANGE THE WAY YOU DO BUSINESS 3 (First Harper Business Essentials 2003) (1997)
- CROSBY, ALFRED W. THE MEASURE OF REALITY: QUANTIFICATION IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1250-1600 (1996)
- Edwards, Harry T. The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
- Gazal-Ayal, Oren. Economic Analysis of Law and Economics, 3 CAPITAL U. L. REV. (2007).
- Ha, Anthony. LegalZoom Files For $120M IPO, Saw $156M In Revenue Last Year, TECHCRUNCH (May 11, 2012),
- JARDINE, LISA. INGENIOUS PURSUITS: BUILDING THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (2000).
- Kimbro, Stephanie L. LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL SERVICES: UNBUNDLING AND THE SELF HELP CLIENT (2012).
- Korobkin, Russell & Ulen, Thomas S. Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
- KUHN, THOMAS S. THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1994).
- Mattei, Ugo. The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge Guido Calabresi, at 200
- Regan, Jr. Milton C. & Heenan, Palmer T. Supply Chains and Porous Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2177-78 (2010).
- Sunstein, Cass R. Foreword: On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1251 (2001).
- Terry, Laurel S. The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as “Service Providers”, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189 (2008)
- Ulen, A. Crowded House: Socioeconomics (and Other) Additions to the Law School and Law and Economics Curricula, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 35, 43, n. 15 (2004),
- Ulen, Thomas S. & Garoupa, Nuno. The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the United States, Illinois Law and Economics Working Papers Series Research Paper No. LE07-009
- Vogel, Louis. in the Foreword to MICHAEL FAURE AND ANTHONY OGUS, ECONOMIE DU DROIT: LE CAS FRANÇAIS (2002)
- Zipp, John F. & Fenwick, Rudy. Is the Academy a Liberal Hegemony?: The Political Orientations and Educational Values of Professors, 70 PUBLIC OPIN. Q. 304 (2006).
 CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: THE REVOLUTIONARY BOOK THAT WILL CHANGE THE WAY YOU DO BUSINESS 3 (First Harper Business Essentials 2003) (1997)
 Laurel S. Terry, The Future Regulation of the Legal Profession: The Impact of Treating the Legal Profession as “Service Providers”, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 189 (2008)
 CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, SCOTT D. ANTHONY & ERIK A. ROTH, SEEING WHAT’S NEXT: USING THE THEORIES OF INNOVATION TO PREDICT INDUSTRY CHANGE, at xv-xvii (2004)
 Anthony Ha, LegalZoom Files For $120M IPO, Saw $156M In Revenue Last Year, TECHCRUNCH (May 11, 2012),
 Supra note 3, SEEING WHAT’S NEXT, at 11-2.
 Id, 13-4
 Id, 12
 Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and PorousBoundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2177-78 (2010).
 Id, 2189
 Supra note 1, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA, at 126
 Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981)
 CHRISTENSEN, supra note 1, at 191-93.
 CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN & MICHAEL E. RAYNOR, THE INNOVATOR’S SOLUTION: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUCCESSFUL GROWTH 35 (2003)
 CHRISTENSEN, supra note 1, at 8-25.
 Stephanie L. Kimbro, LIMITED SCOPE LEGAL SERVICES: UNBUNDLING AND THE SELF HELP CLIENT (2012).
 CAMPBELL, RAY WORTHY. RETHINKING REGULATION AND INNOVATION IN THE U.S. LEGAL SERVICES MARKET. JOURNAL OF LAW & BUSINESS, VOL. 9, No. 1, 2012.
 Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing Economic Cost of Professional Control over Corporate Legal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1695 (2008)
 Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785 (2001)
 SEEING WHAT’S NEXT, supra note 3, at 41.
 INNOVATOR’S PRESCRIPTION, supra note 1, at xxv.
 Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
 Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, The Costs of Dispositionism: The Premature Demise of Situationist Law and Economics, at 24
 Ugo Mattei, The Rise and Fall of Law and Economics: An Essay for Judge Guido Calabresi, at
 Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, at 303.
 Louis Vogel, in the Foreword to MICHAEL FAURE AND ANTHONY OGUS, ECONOMIE DU DROIT: LE CAS FRANÇAIS (2002)
 Ulen, A Crowded House: Socioeconomics (and Other) Additions to the Law School and Law
and Economics Curricula, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 35, 43, n. 15 (2004),
 John F. Zipp & Rudy Fenwick, Is the Academy a Liberal Hegemony?: The Political Orientations and Educational Values of Professors, 70 PUBLIC OPIN. Q. 304
 Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: On Academic Fads and Fashions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1251 (2001).
 Thomas S. Ulen & Nuno Garoupa, The Market for Legal Innovation: Law and Economics in Europe and the United States, Illinois Law and Economics Working Papers Series Research Paper No. LE07-009
 Oren Gazal-Ayal, Economic Analysis of Law and Economics, 3 CAPITAL U. L. REV. (2007).
 Russell Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
 AVINASH DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY 412 – 26 (1999).
 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1994).
 ALFRED W. CROSBY, THE MEASURE OF REALITY: QUANTIFICATION IN WESTERN EUROPE, 1250-1600 (1996)
 LISA JARDINE, INGENIOUS PURSUITS: BUILDING THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION (2000).
 Roger Backhouse, “The Rise of Free Market Economics: Economists and the Role of the State since 1970,” in Symposium: Economists and the Role of Government, in STEVEN MEDEMA & PETER BOETTKE EDS, 37 HISTORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 355 (2005).
 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN THE UK AND USA (1996); Posner, The Future of the Law and Economics Movement in Europe, 17 INTERN’L REV. LAW & ECON. 3 (1997); and Posner, Law and Economics in Common-Law, Civil-Law, and Developing Nations, 17 RATIO JURIS, 66 (2004).
 Cass R. Sunstein, “Incompletely Theorized Arguments.” 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733 (1995).
 Omichund v. Barker, 1 Atk. 21, 33 (K.B. 1744).
 DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
 POSNER, Supra note 34. Law and Economics in Common-Law, at 18